NOTES
THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY AND UNCLOS III*
I.

INTRODUCTION

On July 9, 1982, President Reagan indicated that the United
States would not sign the treaty resulting from the Third United
Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III).' Although the treaty as a whole was acceptable to the United States,
the United States objected to the section on deep seabed mining.2
The President's Statement indicated that the provisions on the
transfer of technology were particularly inimical to United States
interests and precluded United States acceptance.' Prior to the
President's Statement, however, the Conference had overwhelmingly adopted the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea (UNCLOS) 4 over objections by the United States. Thus, after
a decade of negotiation, a comprehensive legal regime for the
oceans could emerge without further participation of one of its
most significant developers and most vital users.
This paper will review the development of the transfer of technology (TOT) concept within the context of larger world tensions,
trace the evolution of the TOT provisions in the UNCLOS III negotiations, and analyze the operation of the TOT provisions to
consider whether they should be objectionable to countries seeking
to protect private mining interests.
II.

TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER

As an object for negotiation, TOT is not unique to UNCLOS III;
it is part of a larger effort by developing countries to address many
perceived inequities in the existing world economic and political
*The author of this note would like to thank Professors Louis B. Sohn and Gabriel M.
Wilner for advice and insight into this topic.
President's Statement on the Convention on the Law of the Sea, 18 WEEKLY CoMP.
PREs. Doc. 887 (July 9, 1982), reprinted in 82 DEP'T ST. BULL. 71 (Aug. 1982).
2 Id.
" Id.; Statement of Ambassador Malone, August 12, 1982, reprinted in Law of the Sea
and Oceans Policy, Current Policy No. 416, United States Department of State 1 (1982).
" U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 62/122 (1982) [hereinafter cited as UNCLOS].
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structure. International TOT has become a major issue of world
debate within the last decade. Barriers to technology access, the
increasing technological gap between nations, and the exigency of
developing countries for appropriate technologies to meet the essential needs of their citizens have created pressures on states to
generate international legal norms which facilitate TOT and control abusive practices in TOT transactions. The elements of this
international debate, to varying extents, are applicable to the debate on TOT in UNCLOS III.
A major problem in the international debate is the definition of
"technology" and of the nature of the TOT process. "Technology"
can include virtually all information applicable to any process; for
example, basket-weaving and slashburn agriculture are technologies. Industrial technologies, however, as major contributors to disparities among standards of living, have become the focus of debate.' A combination of technological breakthroughs in critical
areasO increased access to natural resources important to the new
technologies, and favorable societal structures began a pattern of
industrialization for Britain which was later duplicated in other
Western states. This pattern of industrialization underlies the present balance of industrial and financial power in the world today.7
As a result, developing countries now perceive access to technology
as vital to their economic progress.8
Within the context of the international debate, "technology" includes equipment and its modification, maintenance or improvement; process; patents and other proprietary rights; personnel
I In the 1750's, China, Russia, India, and Great Britain had similar technologies, but
Great Britain, with the smaller domestic market, was the center of the Industrial Revolution. Macioti, Technology and Development: the Historical Experience, in INTEGRATED
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 45 (J.Richardson ed. 1979). For a symposium on TOT, see Symposium: Transnational Technology Transfer: Current Problems and Solutions for the Corporate Practioner,14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. (1981).
0 The critical areas were cotton textiles, iron metallurgy, steam engines, transport, organization of work forces, and medicine. Id.
7 It has been argued, however, that historical accident and imperialistic exploitation are
the basis of these disparities. Id.
' Technology can also be deleterious to the economic health of developing countries.
Rarely is technology beneficial to all the people it affects; often it satisfies the merely nonbasic material needs of a relatively few people. UNCTAD, Development, Environment and
Technology-Towards a Technology for Self-Reliance, U.N. Doc. TD.B/C.6/23/Rev. 1, at 1
(1979). The author of this UNCTAD study uses a conceptual framework wherein technology
is a modifier of ecological cycles. Major inputs of technology cause socioeconomic upheavals
and destroy existing support mechanisms in a society. At the bottom line there is no cost/
benefit analysis that has the scope required to make an objective and realistic analysis. Id.
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training; and know-how. 9 "Transfer of technology" includes the
sale of equipment and processes; training of personnel; licensing of
patents, proprietary rights, and know-how; and any other agreements creating or extending the relationship of supplier and user. 10
International TOT occurs when this relationship is transnational.
The more salient issue is the proprietary nature of most technology. The most desirable technologies are owned by relatively few
companies and concentrated in the developed industrialized countries from which these companies operate.1" The imperfect market
resulting from concentrated protected rights is exacerbated by
non-competitive and oligopolistic markets in recipient countries. 2

' "Technology" is defined by the UNCTAD Draft International Code of Conduct as "...
systematic knowledge for the manufacture of a product, for the application of a process, or
for rendering a service, including managerial and marketing technologies." U.N. Doc. TD/
CODE TOT/14, Chapter 1, para. 1-2(2) (hereinafter cited as Draft Code]. Although an individual product can embody a technology, the mere sale or lease of goods is specifically excluded in the Draft Code. Id. Developing countries prefer to use the wording: "including
associated managerial and marketing technologies." W. FIKcNTsCHR, THE DRAFT INTERNATIONAL CODE OF CONDUCT ON THE TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY 50 (1980).
"oDraft Code, supra note 9, at chapter 1, pars. 1-2(2). Goldscheider, who analogizes the
technology transfer process to musical themes, ranks the variety of possible technological
transfers by increasing order of supplier's commitment as: 1) sales of goods, 2) sales agencies, 3) distributorships, 4) assembly agreements, 5) straight royalty bearing licenses, 6) joint
ventures, 7) subsidiaries, and 8) options. Goldscheider, The Technology Transfer Process:A
Vehicle for Continuity and Change, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225 (1981).
Technology can be purchased from suppliers who sell it embodied in their products, who
use it in their own production, or who merely possess the information. According to
UNCTAD there are three categories of transactions: "(i) simple direct transactions wherein
single components are directly purchased;(ii) process-package transactions wherein complete
systems are purchased, i.e., turnkey operations; (iii) project-package transactions wherein
proprietary rights are acquired, i.e., licensing." UNCTAD, Handbook on the Acquisition of
Technology by Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. UNCTAD/TT/AS5 5-7 (1978).
The methods of transfer enumerated above can be classified as direct transfers of technology. Indirect transfers could include participation in the building up of a nation's indigenous research and development capabilities or the training of researchers, scientists, and
entrepreneurs at institutions in developed countries. The term "reverse transfer of
technolgy" refers to the so-called "brain-drain" of developing countries-the loss of critical
native technicians. See UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
AC.11/25/Rev. 1 (1975); UNCTAD, The Reverse Transfer of Technology: A Survey of Its
Main Features, Causes, and Policy Implications, U.N. Doc. TC/B/C.6/47 (1979).
"Know-how" refers to the formuli, blueprints, manuals, specs, schematics, and other recognized forms of notation for technology. Goldscheider, supra.
UNCLOS has a specific definition for TOT, see infra text accompanying note 100.
" For tables showing the distribution and ownership of patents, see UNCTAD/WIPO,
The Role of the Patent System in the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19/Rev. 1 (1975). It is important to remember that licensing agreements
are usually not just patents but often include trademarks, know-how, technical training and
services. Id. at 80.
" Contractor & Sagali-Nejad, InternationalTechnology Transfer:Major Issues and Pol-
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Bargaining asymmetry occurs because of the relative dearth of producers or the scarcity of suppliers.1 3 Suppliers of technology can
exploit this imbalance either by obtaining unusually high compensation or by retaining control over affiliates and other users
through licensing agreements."' The consequences of this type of
relationship between suppliers and users include balance of payments problems, high consumer costs, and increased technological
dependence, all of which inhibit economic growth in those countries that are dependent on the import of technology.18 These disadvantageous conditions make technology acquisition a major requirement for the economic development of most countries."
Unfortunately, need alone is an insufficient incentive for suppliers
to transfer technology to developing nations. The profit motive is
the energizing force behind technology development and dis17
tribution.
A.

InternationalLegal Norm-Making on TOT

Any solution to the problems implicit in international TOT
would have to eliminate restrictive transfer practices which are
detrimental to a country's economy and provide sufficient incentives to encourage transfers of appropriate technology. The present
state of the international framework concerning TOT, however,
icy Responses, 12 J. INT'L Bus.

STUD. 113

(Fall 1981).

18 Id.; see Bargaining Asymmetry in Technology Transfer; A Games Theoretical Ap-

proach, 18 J. Dxv. STuD. 85 (1981).There are ongoing efforts to strengthen the position of
recipients of technology. See U.N. Center on Transnational Corporations, Measures for
Strengthening the Negotiating Capacity of Governments in Their Relations with Transnational Corporations; Technology Transfer Through Transnational Corporations-A Technical Paper, U.N. Doc. ST/CTC/11 (1979).
14 See generally UNCTAD, Control of Restrictive Practices in Transfer of Technology
Transactions, U.N. Doc. TC/B/C.6/72 (1982). "Unusually high compensation" raises the issue of to what extent revenues from transfers are fortuitous profits over and above the necessary amortization of research and development costs. Contractor & Sagali-Nejad, supra
note 12, at 114.
16 See UNCTAD, Transfer of Technology-Its Implications for Development and Environment, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/22 (1978). In addition, completely inappropriate technology,
once purchased, can burden fragile economies and deplete the scarce resources of nascient
industrial sectors which lack the capacity to absorb the technology. Id.
"e See id.
11 The transnational corporation is a commercial supplier of technology seeking an economic return on its holdings of proprietary knowledge. Jeffries, Regulation of Transfer of
Technology: An Evaluation of the UNCTAD Code of Conduct, 18 HARV. INT'L L.J. 309, 315
(1977). The U.N. recognizes the dangers of overregulation causing sellers to be inhibited in
transferring. See National Legislation and Regulations Relating to Transnational Corporations, U.N. Doc. E/C.10/8, at 17 (1967).
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strongly favors and protects the exclusive, proprietary dimension
of the TOT process. Various conventions establish universally recognized intellectual/industrial property rights, particularly in pat-

ents, trademarks, and copyrights.18 These conventions fail to meet
the needs of developing states in TOT acquisition; therefore, these
states have made a concerted effort to reform the international legal order."9
At the international level, the movement to reform the system

under which technology is owned and transferred is part of a larger
effort to resolve imbalance within the world economic order. Developing countries expressed their dissatisfaction over this imbalance
2
in a declaration of a New International Economic Order (NIEO) '

and in the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States.21
18The principal convention delimiting property rights is the Lisbon Revision of 1958 of
the International Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property of Paris of 1883, 13
U.S.T. 1, T.I.A.S. No. 4931 (1958). See also UNCTAD, The Role of the Patent System in
the Transfer of Technology to Developing Countries, U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/19/Rev. 1
(1975); UNCTAD, Agreed Conclusions and Recommendations of the Group of Experts, U.N.
Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.2/L.2 (1975).
See generally Haar, Revision of the Paris Convention: A Realignment of the Private and
Public Interests in the InternationalPatent System, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 77 (1982).
N Corrective measures taken by individual countries are well documented. See UNCTAD,
Control of Restrictive Practices in Transfer of Technology Transactions, U.N. Doc. TD/B/
C.6/91 (1982). Some were adopted pursuant to regional agreements, while others were generated internally. For an example of a regional agreement, see Decision No. 24, Dec. 31, 1970,
as amended by Decisions Nos. 37, June 24, 1971; 37-A, July 17, 1971; 70, Feb. 13, 1973; 103,
Oct. 30, 1976; and 109, Nov. 30, 1976 of the Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Andean Foreign Investment Code, reprinted in 16 I.L.M. 138 (1977); Decision 24, reprintedin
10 I.L.M. 152, 159 (1971).
Antitrust and patent legislation is common to most countries and often equated with
TOT laws. See UNCTAD, supra; but see Radway, Antitrust, Technology Transfers and
Joint Ventures in Latin American Development, 15 LAW. AM. 47 (1983) (Radway argues
that TOT laws were created because of balance of payments problems rather than free trade
concerns). Some countries, particularly in Latin America, have specific TOT legislation to
restrict TOT practices that are detrimental to the domestic economy. See TECHNOLOGY
TRANSFER: LAwS AND PRACTICES IN LATIN AmERICA (B. Carl ed. 1978); Wilner, The Transfer
of Technology to Latin America, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 269 (1981). Legislation in developing countries usually establishes an administrative agency that is empowered to regulate
transactions prospectively through a registration and/or evaluation and approval procedure.
See id. at 272-74.
2o Declaration and Action Programme on the Establishment of a New Economic Order,
G.A. Res. 3201 and G.A. Res. 3202, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (6th spec. seas.) (No. 1) at 3, U.N.
Doc. A/9559 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Declaration and Action Programme].
" G.A. Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (2315th Plen. mtg.) (No. 31) at 50, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/3281 (XXIX) (1975), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251 (1975). See generally Note, The Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States: A Solution to the Development Aid Problem?,
4 GA. J. INT'L & Comp. L. 441 (1974).
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Both of these documents specifically address the TOT issue. 22 Concurrently, the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), which is a forum on economic matters for the
developing countries and an active participant in the NIEO,2 began working to reform the international legal regime for TOT.
UNCTAD established the Permanent Committee on the Transfer
of Technology to study the problem, initiated negotiations on an
international code of conduct for TOT,2 " and introduced similar
activity to amend the various conventions on intellectual/industrial
property rights so as to favor developing states.2 5
The efforts of UNCTAD to implement a code of conduct have
not been successful because of the competing interests of the principal negotiating groups: developing states, developed states, and
communist bloc states. The Draft Code of Conduct on the Transfer
of Technology 6 represents a consensus among these groups on two
basic tenets: to establish equitable standards on which to base the
relationship between the parties to TOT transactions and to facilitate and increase the international flow of technology. 7 In respect
to these tenets, the Draft Code may reflect the political and moral
Declaration and Action Programme, supra note 20, art. IV. Transfer of technology was
a major subject along with the recognition of the need to develop indigenous scientific
capacities.
Charter of Economic Rights and Duties, supra note 21, art. 13. This article is designed to
promote the transfer of technology to developing countries. According to paragraph 4,
States should cooperate in evolving internationally accepted guidelines or regulations for the
transfer of technology. Id. art. 13, para. 4.
Both declarations are consistent with the U.N. Charter Preamble which states that one of
the purposes of the organization is "to promote social progress and better standards of life
in larger freedom" and "to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples." U.N. CHARTER preamble. Specific mandates
are found in U.N. CHARTER arts. 55 and 59.
" See J. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL EcONoMIc RELATIONS 378 (1977). UNCTAD was first

convened in Geneva and later accepted as a permanent organ of the U.N. General Assembly
by G.A. Res. 1995, 19 U.N. GAOR Supp. 15 at 1, U.N. Doc. A/5815 (1965). See generally
Gardner, The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 22 INr'L ORG. 99
(1968); Walters, UNCTAD: Intervenor Between Poor and Rich States, 7 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 527 (1973).
Resolution 39 (III) of UNCTAD III, reprinted in U.N. Doc. TD/B/AC.11/9, 55 (1972).
U UNCTAD, The International Patent System: A Revision of the Paris Convention for
the Protection of Industrial Property, U.N. Doc. TD/B/C.6/AC.3/2 (1977). See also Blair,
Technology Transfers as an Issue in North/South Negotiations, 14 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.
301, 313-17 (1981).
" Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology (as at close of 4th
Seass.) U.N. Doc. TD/CODE TOT/33 (Apr. 10, 1981).
' See generally P. NANYENYA-TAKIRAMBUADE, TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER AND INTERNATIONAL
LAW (1980).
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commitments of most of the states,2" but there is little agreement

as to the methods of implementing the Code's goals.
III.

TRANSFER OF TECHNOLOGY IN

UNCLOS III

Technology, UNCLOS III, and the NIEO are inextricably intertwined. 29 Developing countries perceive technology as a major factor in economic and political disparity. Thus, access to technology
is key to the development of a more equitable order. In turn, technological advances have contributed substantially to the demand
for changes in the law of the sea.30
The technology specifically at issue in UNCLOS III is used for
the recovery and processing of manganese nodules which lie on the
ocean floor."' Technological advances in nodule recovery began in
the 1960's with the development and testing of three recovery systems: the line-bucket lift, the conventional slurry pump, and the
air lift.3 2 This technology and the techniques for its use are at an

See Schachter, The Twilight Existence of Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71
AM. J. INT'L L. 296, 303 (1977).
" Juda, UNCLOS III and the New InternationalEconomic Order, 7 OcEA DEV. & INT'L
L. 221, 235-36 (1979).
" Another impetus was the obsolescence of the four 1958 Conventions. Convention of the
High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T. 2312, T.I.A.S. No. 5200, 450 U.N.T.S. 82; Convention on
the Continental Shelf, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 471, T.I.A.S. No. 5578, 499 U.N.T.S. 311;
Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, Apr. 29, 1958, 15 U.S.T. 1606,
T.I.A.S. No. 5639, 516 U.N.T.S. 205; Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living
Resources of the High Seas, Apr. 29, 1958, 17 U.S.T. 138, T.I.A.S. No. 5269, 559 U.N.T.S.
285.
" The composition of manganese nodules includes nickel, copper, cobalt, and manganese.
The ratio of these metals varies according to the location of the deposits. Thus, even though
nodules are located in most of the Earth's oceans at varying depths and distances from land,
only nodules in the deep ocean have commercially acceptable ore content. The most productive area is the Pacific Ocean floor, 18,000 feet deep and 1000 miles east-southeast of Hawaii. Recovery and transportation present significant technological challenges. In addition,
large quantities must be recovered to make an operation commercially viable. Once transported, the nodules are easily crushed and are amenable to several forms of hydrometallurgical processing. NYHART, A COST MODEL OF DEEP OCEAN MINING AND AssOCIATED REGULATORY IssuEs ES1 (1978).
" Members of the industry now consider the line-bucket system primative and unreliable.
The air lift system is the newest and still requires extensive testing. These lift systems are
only part of an ocean mining system requiring one or more 800 foot custom vessels similar
to deep water oil drillships; two-foot diameter, 20,000 foot long pipe-string weighted by a
hydrodynamic depressor to hold the pipe-string vertically; a collecting device; a special
power plant for the vessel; and special navigational and control equipment. In addition, a
crew must be trained to properly operate and maintain the system. Id. See generally
UNITED NATIONS, DEPARTMENT OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL AFFAS, Sea-Bed
Mineral Resource Development: Recent Activities of the International Consortia, U.N. Doc.
ST/ESA/107 (1980).
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early stage of development"3 and most are owned by groups of multinational corporations known as "consortia.""
Regardless of its nascency, technological advances in ocean mining and manganese nodule recovery prompted a speech before the
United Nations General Assembly by Malta's Ambassador Pardo.3 5
The speech inspired UNCLOS III negotiations concerning the creation of an international entity for the sole purpose of providing a
more equitable distribution of the wealth recovered by this technology. Pardo's comments, reinforcing earlier remarks by President
Johnson," introduced the concept of "the common heritage of
mankind 3 7 in reference to seabed resources. The international
community soon reached a broad consensus on the principle of
"the common heritage of mankind."" 8 Nations agreed that the concept applies to resources in the ocean beyond the limits of national
jurisdiction;3 9 however, disagreement still exists over the exact
meaning of the principle.40
The "common heritage of mankind" theme in Pardo's speech
then surfaced in the NIEO debate. Developing countries began to
claim that technology is part of a universal human heritage and
that all countries have a natural right to free access to technology

" G. Jzmcm, E. ScHANzE, & W. HAusER, A JoIr Va
zrual
AGREEMENT FOR SEABED MINING 35 (1981). The authors observe that technology characterized by very few or no previous
applications with a short elapsed time since development and limited diffusion is termed
"leading-edge-technology." Id.
" See UNITED NATIONS, CENTRE FOR ECONOMICAL SOCIAL INFORMATION, DESI FACTS 79/1
(April 1979). The issue of ownership is very important because in this case it helps determine availability. Although United States companies have traditionally dominated the consortia, most consortia contracts provide that newly developed technology is common property of all the members. Hearings on S. 2053 Before the Subcomm. on Arms Control,
Oceans and International Environment of the Committee on Foreign Relations, 95th
Cong., 1st Sess. 205 (1978) (statement of A. Kaufman, counsel for Seldco, Inc.).
"Note Verbale dated 17 August 1967 from the Permanent Mission of Malta to the
United Nations, 22 U.N. GAOR, U.N. Doc. A/6695 (1967).
e Remarks at the Commissioning of the New Research Ship, the "Oceanographer," 2
WmKv Coma'. PREs. Doc. 930 (July 13, 1966) [hereinafter cited as Remarks].
7 Maltese Delegation, Note Verbale, supra note 35. President Johnson said, "We must
ensure that the deep seas and the ocean bottoms, are, and remain, the legacy of all human
beings." Remarks, supra note 36, at 930.
" See Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 2749, 25 U.N. GAOR
Supp. (No. 28) at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
'Id.
"See Van Dyke & Yuen, "Common Heritage" v. "Freedom of the High Seas": Which
Governs the Seabed?, 19 SAN DIEGO L. Rzv. 493, 521-30 (1982). Pardo is disappointed with
the interpretation of common heritage reflected in the Law of the Sea Treaty. See Pardo,
An Opportunity Lost, in LAw OF Tm SEA 19 (B. Oxman ed. 1983).
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for improving standards of living for their people.4 1 This argument,
at its extreme, completely ignores the costs and incentives that underlie the creation of technologies. The developed states perceive
the common heritage argument in relation to TOT to be singularly
self-serving and hypocritical since the developing countries are not
offering free access to their own natural resources or technologies.
The fundamental issues of the NIEO permeated UNCLOS III
negotiations from the beginning. 42 The developing countries had
challenged the Western industrialized countries' attempt to control
the potentially economically strategic manganese nodules through
technological advantage. They saw a properly instituted international seabed authority as a significant step toward a NIEO.'8
Ideological differences over the meaning and scope of the NIEO
extended to the subject matter of UNCLOS III, quickly subverting
the general agreement that there should be some revenue sharing
of seabed resources. 4 This conflict of ideologies became acutely
apparent in the negotiations on the system of exploration and
exploitation.
A.

UNCLOS III Mining Technology Negotiations: General
Obligations

The TOT issue in UNCLOS III negotiations consisted of two elements: the first precatory, the second mandatory. The early UNCLOS III negotiations contained only the precatory element, a
general obligation of states to make good faith efforts in facilitating and promoting the transfer of marine technology, particularly
to developing states. The general obligations, which do not specifically mandate the transfer of mining technology, now appear in
Part XIV of the Convention,"5 the provisions of which correspond
to language in the NIEO. 4" The specific obligation for the transfer
of mining technology to the operating arm of the Authority (Enter" Roffe, International Code of Conduct on Transfer of Technology, 11 J. WORLD TRADE
L. 186, 187 (1977).
" Comment, UNCLOS II: The Remaining Obstacles to Consensus on the Deepsea Mining Regime, 16 TEx. INT'L L.J. 79, 94 (1981). Proponents of the NIEO and the new convention to govern seabed exploitation encouraged the integration of the two issues. See A.
PARDO & E. BORGESE, THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
(1975). See Borgese, The Law of the Sea, Sci. AM., March 1983, at 42, 47.
4 T. KRONMILLER, THE LAWFULNESS OF DEEP SEABED MINING 13 (1979).
4 Henkin, The Changing Law of the Sea: Technology, Law and Politics, in MARINE
TECHNOLOGY AND LAW 137, 143 (1978).
4" UNCLOS, supra note 4, Part XIV.
" Declaration and Action Programme, supra note 20, para. 4.
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prise) was not included initially, probably because the nature and
function of the International Seabed Authority was unclear 47 and
unapproved. In addition, the consensus was that if the Authority
itself wished to engage in mining operations it could do so through
joint ventures or other contractual arrangements. In other words,
the Authority did not require the technology; instead it would
reach some agreement with those who already had the technology.4' Presumably, an authority with jurisdiction over deep seabed
mining activities would have the bargaining power to obtain concessions from private miners.
From this point onward in the negotiations, the nature of the
system for exploitation and exploration determined the extent of
TOT obligations. The First Committee was entrusted with developing an acceptable system of deep seabed exploitation. The developing countries, negotiating in concert as the Group of 77 (G-77),
supported a unitary system in which all mining would be controlled by the Authority alone or in joint ventures. Under the unitary system, the assumption that the Authority would have the
bargaining power to obtain mining technology probably preempted
discussion of TOT. Meanwhile, the Third Committee, which had
jurisdiction over the general obligations of states to transfer
marine technology, received a proposal that the Authority require
private miners to train nationals of developing states and to make
their patents available to developing states.4 9 The Third Committee initiated no action on the proposal which was outside its purview; however, this proposal foreshadowed the demand for the
transfer of mining technology to developing countries.
At the Third Session of UNCLOS III, the desire of the developing countries to obtain deep seabed mining technology overshadowed the issue of technology transfer to the Authority. The Informal Single Negotiating Text (ISNT)50 produced at the end of the
session incorporated a unitary system in which the Enterprise
7 Report of the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Sea-Bed and Ocean Floor Beyond
the Limits of National Jurisdiction, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. 21, Vol. 1, at 2, U.N. Doc. A/9021
(1973) [hereinafter cited as Report of the Committee].
'* Stevenson & Oxman, The Preparationsfor the Law of the Sea Conference, 68 AM. J.
INT'L L. 1, 6 (1974).
49 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.3/L.12, III Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 253 (1974) [hereinafter cited as III Official Records].
Informal Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.8, IV Official Records of
the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 137 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
ISNT].
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would conduct all activities in the international deep seabed area, 1
(the "Area"), again presumably obtaining or controlling mining
technology through contract or joint venture." 2 The text also directed the Authority to regulate the transfer of this acquired or
controlled mining technology to developing countries.'" By this
point in the negotiations, the First Committee had received jurisdiction over TOT provisions with respect to the Authority and the
Area, and had created a 4general obligation of states to facilitate
access to this technology.
A Revised Single Negotiating Text (RSNT),"5 produced at the
end of the Fifth Session, reformulated the TOT provisions of the
ISNT. The revisions limited the states' obligation to facilitate access to only "relevant" technology" and deleted references to the
transfer of "mineral processing" technology.' 7 The language of the
provisions remained precatory and the proffered system for exploitation remained unitary.
Throughout the previous negotiations, the demeloped states objected to a powerful Authority in the context of a unitary system.
U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, broke the impasse with a
proposal'" for a parallel system. In the Kissinger proposal, for
every mine site developed by private miners or States, another
mine site would be reserved for the exclusive use of the Enterprise.
Logically, under a parallel system the Enterprise would require
financing and technology in acting for the benefit of developing
states. Kissinger committed the United States to help provide
both 5 9 in order to get the Enterprise into operation. By offering
" Id. art. 22, para. 1.

" Id. Part 1; Annex I, Part B, para. 4(d); Annex I, Part C, para. 5.
11 Id. Annex I, para. 12(11). Only the most advanced of the developing countries would be
able to use such technology without significant drain on their domestic economic infrastructure. See Stevenson & Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the
Sea: The 1975 Geneva Session, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 763, 795 (1975).
ISNT, supra note 50, art. 11(a).
Revised Single Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/AP.9/Rev. 1, IV Official
Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 144 (1976) [hereinafter cited as RSNTJ.
" Id. art. 11(a).
" Id. Annex I, para. 12(a)(xii).
See Secretary Kissinger Discusses U.S. Position on Law of the Sea Conference, 75
DEP'T ST. BULL. 395 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Kissinger]; see also Report by Mr. P.B.
Engo, Chairman of the First Committee on the Work of the Committee, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/L.15, VI Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of
the Sea 130, 132 (1976) [hereinafter cited as VI Official Records].
"9 Kissinger said that "the United States would be prepared to agree to a means of
financing the Enterprise " and would be prepared to negotiate "provisions for the transfer of
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access to technology that it did not own, the United States Government unconsciously placed the burden of providing the relevant
technology on private miners who sought access to the deep seabed,60 thus setting the stage for mandatory TOT.
B.

UNCLOS III Mining Technology Negotiations: Mandatory
Provisions

The Sixth Session proved pivotal with respect to TOT provisions
under the auspices of the First Committee. In spite of the lack of
either discussion or consensus for changing or expanding the TOT
provisions contained in the Revised Single Negotiating Text, 61 the
Informal Composite Negotiating Text which emerged from the session contained an entirely new set of TOT provisions, making TOT
a precondition to mining.2 The obligations of states with respect
to TOT remained precatory and now appear in article 144 of the
Convention."
Regardless of their ideological or practical origins," the mandatory TOT provisions caused considerable consternation and opposition. The United States delegation vowed to eliminate the provisions because they perceived them as merely ideological and
unnecessary for the successful functioning of the Enterprise; 6
technology so that the existing advantage of.certain industrial states would be equalized
over a period of time." Kissinger, supra note 58, at 398. Elliot Richardson negotiated for the
removal of the TOT provisions until he was replaced by the new Administration. See Statement by Elliot L. Richardson, Ambassador at Large, Special Representative of the President
for the Law of the Sea Conference (unpublished statement after the Seventh Session of
UNCLOS III). See also Alternative Means for Financing the Enterprise, U.N. Doc. A/
CONF.62/C.1/L.17, VI Official Records, supra note 58, at 156.
" Private miners would have to provide the technology unless the United States government purchased the right to transfer the technology itself.
*lRSNT, supra note 55.
,Informal Composite Negotiating Text, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10 and Add. 1, VIII
Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 1, Annex II,
para. 4(c)(ii) (1977) [hereinafter cited as ICNT].
" UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 144.
" This shift to mandatory TOT by private miners could have its origin in both ideological and practical concerns. The Chairman of the First Committee, Paul Engo of Cameroon,
was responsible for submitting the text. As a national of a developing state, he could have
been influenced by G-77 activities in UNCTAD, in which the debate over a code of conduct
for the international transfer of technology and the supportive rhetoric had reached a high
point. Concurrently, Chairman Engo may have had serious practical reservations with respect to both the ability of the Enterprise to obtain the newest, most efficient deep seabed
mining technology, and the willingness of the consortia of transnational corporations to supply this technology to what would be, in effect, a competitor. See infra note 116 and accompanying text.
" Statement by Elliot L. Richardson, Ambassador at Large, Special Representative of the
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however, the delegation's primary concern was the possible adverse
effects the provisions might have on the progress of deep seabed
mining. 66 During the remainder of the UNCLOS III negotiations,

with respect to TOT, the developed states attempted to limit the
provisions, while the developing states attempted to tighten the
provisions so that the consortia could not avoid them.

At the beginning of the Seventh Session, the First Committee
split into seven negotiating groups. Negotiating Group One,
chaired by Frank Njenga of Kenya, was the forum for discussion of

the system of exploration and exploitation, including TOT to the
Enterprise. 7 Mr. Njenga's report, 68 as incorporated in the report of
the Chairman of the First Committee," contained proposed
changes to the Informal Composite Negotiating Text. The proposed language inserted "commercial" before the phrase "terms

and conditions

70

to ensure that consortia and other technology

suppliers would receive compensation that was comparable to that
available in the open market. A commercial arbitration clause was
added to settle disputes as to what was commercially fair and reasonable, removing the question from the Sea-Beds Disputes
Chamber. 1
The upper-tier developing countries continued to press for ac-

cess to technology made available to the Enterprise and succeeded
in inserting the so-called "Brazil Clause" in the proposed revisions.
The Brazil Clause requires contractors to make technology availa-

President for the Law of the Sea Conference (May 22, 1978).
See infra note 164.
6 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/62, X Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference
on the Law of the Sea 6 (1978) [hereinafter cited as X Official Records]. For an explanation
of the division, see Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea:
The Seventh Session, 73 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1979).
U.N. Doc. NG 1/12 and NG1/10/Rev. 1, X Official Records, supra note 67, at 19, 21.
*9 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/RCNG/1, X Official Records, supra note 67, at 13.
70 U.N. Doc. NG1/10/Rev. 1, Annex II, para. 4(c)(ii ter), X Official Records, supra note
67, at 27. The insertion of "commercial" raises considerable questions. See infra notes 12231 and accompanying text for a discussion of this ambiguity.
" U.N. Doc. GN1/10/Rev. 1, Annex I1, para. 5(j)(iv), X Official Records, supra note 67, at
27. The following changes were also agreed upon: after the application phase, the miner
would now have to submit to the Enterprise a general description of the technology he
would use, id. para. 4(c)(ii); the applicant would be obligated to make available technology
which he owned or could legally transfer, id. para. 4(c)(ii ter); the applicant could not use
technology which was owned by third parties and not legally transferable by the miner,
unless the owner agreed in advance to make the technology available, id. para. 4(c)(ii bis);
finally, the new language would reduce the possibility of overreaching by the Enterprise by
providing for TOT negotiations between the contractor and the Enterprise after the mining
contract was granted, id. para. 4(c)(ii ter).
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ble to developing countries on the same basis as it is made available to the Enterprise. 7 Extending the benefits of mandatory TOT
to developing countries was a considerable ideological leap; moreover, only the most economically-sound countries, whether acting
singly or jointly, could afford to engage in deep seabed mining
activities.
The revised Informal Composite Negotiating Text that emerged
from the Eighth Session 73 incorporated most of the proposed revisions from the Seventh Session as well as the following important
additions: "technology" was defined;7 4 a requirement that the Enterprise seek and purchase technology available on the open market before it required the contractor to provide its technology was
added;75 and a rule that governments must provide the Enterprise
with access to mineral processing technology was included.
Further refinements occurred in the Ninth Session. States now
were obligated to ensure that the Enterprise had access to recovery
technology."7 The technology that a contractor had to make availa-

ble was limited to technology actually used in carrying out activities in the area under a contract approved by the Enterprise.78 The
contractor would be required to obtain a legally binding and enforceable agreement from third party owners of technology, allowing the transfer of technology that the contractor would not
otherwise be entitled to transfer." This provision was limited only
to those licenses the contractor could obtain without substantial
72

Id. para. 4(c)(ii quinte).

71 Informal Composite Negotiating Text Rev. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev. 1, XI
Official Records of the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea 92 (1980)
[hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev. 1).
7 Id. Annex II, para. 4(bis)(e).
For the purpose of this paragraph, 'technology' means the equipment and technical know-how, including manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and
technical advice and assistance necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a system for the exploration for and exploitation of the resources of the Area and the
non-exclusive legal right to use these items for that purpose.
Id. An important aspect of this definition is that it emphasizes the critical element which is
the knowledge to effectively operate means of production, or "technological mastery." See
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: NEW Issuxa, NEW ANALYSIS 7 (A. Heston & H. Pack eds. 1981).
71 ICNT/Rev. 1, supra note 73, Annex II, pars. 4(bis)(a)(iii).
76 Id. Annex II, pars. 4(bis)(c).
7 Informal Composite Negotiating Text/Revision 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WP.10/Rev.
2, Annex Ill, art. 5(5) (1980), reprinted in 2 THnm UNrrmED NATIONS CONFRENCE ON TIE
LAW OF THE SRA: Docuum'S 1, 316 (1982) [hereinafter cited as ICNT/Rev. 21.
76 Id. Annex I, art. 5(3)(a), (b), & (c).
79 Id. Annex III, art. 5(3)(c).
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cost. 80 The contractor was given a forty-five day period in which to
revise an offer in accordance with the decision of a commercial arbitration panel.8" Most importantly, a ten-year time limit, to commence from the moment the Enterprise begins commercial production, was placed on the TOT obligation of the contractor.8" With
that amendment, G-77 announced that they considered all negotia-

tions on TOT closed.8" With respect to TOT, the language of the
revised text provided at the end of the Ninth Session, entitled
"Draft Convention on the Law of the Sea,"" emerged relatively
unscathed in the final Convention as Annex III, article 5,85 despite
considerable opposition by the United States delegation.
C.

UNCLOS III Mining Technology Negotiations: Final Efforts to Revise
.The Reagan Administration took office prior to the commencement of the Tenth Session, and immediately pressed for review

and change in the Draft Convention. 6 The new administration

considered the entire mining regime inimical to United States interests. Differing perceptions of the TOT issue were apparent in
87
the change of administration.

" Id.
Id. Annex III, art. 5(4).
Id. Annex III, art. 5(7).
Report of the Coordinators of the Working Group of 21, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/
L.28, at 28 (1980). For further discussion of TOT in the first nine sessions of UNCLOS III,
see Brewster, Transfer of Mining Technology to the InternationalEnterprise,Oceans Policy Study 2:4 (1980).
" ICNT/Rev. 2, supra note 77.
8 UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5. The general obligations of State Parties are
found in art. 144 and Part XIV (arts. 226-278).
" Oxman, The Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea: The Tenth
Session (1981), 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1982).
87 Compare the testimony of the Reagan administration's ambassador to UNCLOS III
with that of the Carter Administration's ambassador. In testimony before the House, Ambassador Malone of the Reagan Administration said:
[T]hrough [TOT] provisions the Draft Convention compels the sale of proprietary
information and technology now largely in U.S. hands. [W]ith certain restrictions,
the Enterprise, through mandatory transfer, is guaranteed access on request to the
seabed mining technology owned by private companies and also technology used
by them but owned by others. The text further guarantees similar access by any
developing country planning to go into seabed mining. We must also carefully consider how such provisions relate to security-related technology.
Testimony of Ambassador James L. Malone Before the Subcomm. on Oceanography of the
House Merchant Marine and Fisheries Comm., Apr. 28, 1981, cited in Oxman, supra note
86, at 9.
In contrast, Carter Administration's Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson had identified as
81
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By the Eleventh Session, which was the final session, the United
States had identified six objectives in revising the Draft Convention including the TOT provisions.ss The "Green Book"8 9 of
United States proposals was rejected outright by G-77.90 To break
the impasse, eleven western nations, excluding the United States,
banded together and produced a package of amendments, including one that met United States objectives with respect to TOT.91
This effort resulted in no substantial changes in the accepted

frequent misstatements:
. . .that U.S. companies would be required to sell sensitive national security-related technology. On the contrary, the U.S. would deny an export license. In addition, the text of the Convention suspends obligations to supply information when
disclosure is contrary to essential interests of security.
. . .that a company seeking a contract would be required to transfer its technology without adequate compensation[.] In fact, the Enterprise must seek technology on the open market and then must pay fair and reasonable commercial terms
and conditions subject to binding commercial arbitration.
Testimony by Ambassador Elliot L. Richardson, House Foreign Affairs Comm., May 14,
1981, cited in Oxman, supra note 86, at 11 n.27.
The war of words continues, clearly illustrated by Ambassador Richardson's letter to the
editor in response to Ambassador Malone's article, Who Needs the Sea Treaty, 54 FOR.
PoL'Y 44 (1984), and Ambassador Malone's rebuttal. Letters to the Editor, 55 FoR. POL'Y
178 (1984).
" Report of the United States Delegation to the Eleventh Session of the United Nations
Conference on the Law of the Sea, Mar. 8 - Apr. 30, 1982. (June 1982).
89 U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/L.121 (1982).
" One representative of G-77 noted that "TOT, as understood in the context of the Convention, is not reflected anywhere in annex I, article 5 [of the United States amendments]." Written Statement of the Delegation of Benin, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/22
(1982).
91 U.N. DOC. A/CONF.62/L.104 (1982), reprintedin Report, supra note 88, at Appendix
C. The proposed language was as follows:
art. 5(3)(a) - the contractor must cooperate with the Authority in the acquisition of
technology.
art. 5(3)(b) - the contractor should make available technology which he has made available or is willing to make available to third parties. This should be done by license under
terms and conditions no less favorable than those available to third parties.
art. 5(3)(c) - the contractor should acquire, if possible without substantial cost, a right to
transfer any other technology he uses that is not included in (b).
art. 5(3)(d) - the contractor should assist the Enterprise in obtaining technology on the
free market.
art. 5(3)(e) - the contractor should take the same measures of subparagraphs (a)-(d) for
the benefit of a developing state or group of developing states.
art. 5(4) - disputes between the contractor and the Authority and State Parties and the
Authority shall be subject to Part XI as appropriate. 3(b) disputes shall go to commercial
arbitration ("binding" deleted).
art. 5(5) - to comply with Part XI, States Parties that sponsor contractors will help the
Enterprise by taking effective measures to implement paragraph 3 consistent with national
laws to prevent concerted refusal of contractors to supply the Enterprise with technology on
commercial terms and conditions. Id. (roughly paraphrased).
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convention.
D.

Post-Conference Assessment

In retrospect, it is ironic that the United States supported the
convening of UNCLOS 11192 and was aware from the beginning
that the participants were negotiating a "package deal;""3 but once
United States objectives were negotiated, the Reagan Administration refused to approve concessions in the exploitation of the deep
seabed. 4 It is natural, however, for a more conservative administration to reject the control of a supranational body over a United
States economic activity.9s Mandatory TOT is only one of many
provisions in the UNCLOS mining regime which is, on its face, incompatible with principles of a free market economy.96 Nevertheless, there is no record upon which to judge the effects of such provisions,"" and most commentators conclude the provisions will
never be invoked.9" The uncertainty of the effect of these provisions is a slender reed on which to risk losing the many other
favorable aspects of the treaty. The next section explores the potential problems in the application of the provisions.

See Report of the Committee, supra note 47.
93 Id.

" See Ratiner, The Law of the Sea: Crossroadfor U.S. Policy, 60 FOR. AFP. 1006 (1982).
96 Id. at 1008. Any international organization which is going to discuss concepts of reasonableness, equity, and legality of business practices, and monitor preferential treatments or
imbalances in the world marketplace must be "based upon at least some democratic legitimation" for all interested parties to have "trust and confidence. . . [in its activities]." "An
organization of sovereign states is, by its very definition, no democratic organization of the
citizens of these states." Such an organization, therefore, cannot meaningfully comprise a
body that governs entities other than states unless those entities are represented and participate in the execution of legal norms. In addition, the international organization would
require a staff of considerable expertise, including personnel who are experienced in international and domestic forms of contract and antitrust law, and persons who are familiar with
specific technologies and world markets. W. FIKENTrsCHR, supra note 9, at 133.
Although Japan eventually signed, it also found the deepsea mining provisions entirely
unsatisfactory. U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/WS/38 (1983).
" Ratiner, supra note 94, at 1006; see Oxman, Introduction: On Evaluating the Draft
Convention of the Law of the Sea, 19 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 453, 454-57 (1982).
" Burke & Brokaw, Ideology and the Law of the Sea, in LAW OF THE SEA 43, 57 (B.
Oxman ed. 1983).
" See infra note 172 and accompanying text. For a recent article with a political perspective on this topic, see Transfer of Seabed Mining Technology: A Stumbling Block to United
States Ratificationof the Law of the Sea Convention, 13 OcEAN DEv. & INT'L L. 427 (1984).
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TRANSFER OF MINING TECHNOLOGY: IMPLEMENTATION AND
PROBLEMS

The provisions on the transfer of mining technology are codified
as Annex III, article 5, in the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). 9 The article defines "technology" as
"the specialized equipment and technical know-how, including
manuals, designs, operating instructions, training and technical advice and assistance, necessary to assemble, maintain and operate a
viable [mining] system and the legal right to use these items for
that purpose on a non-exclusive basis." 0 0 Article 5 anticipates four
possible categories of transfer: a TOT arranged by the Enterprise
on the open market; a mandatory TOT from the contractor to the
Enterprise; a mandatory TOT from the contractor to a developing
state; and a contracted TOT under joint venture with the
Enterprise.
A.

TOT Arranged by the Enterprise on the Open Market

All entities that submit a plan of work to engage in mining activities in the Area 0 1 are also required to submit a general description of the technology which they intend to use.10 2 The general
description does not have to reveal proprietary information, but,
presumably, it must contain enough information to adequately enlighten the Authority as to the nature of each item of equipment
and its function. An adequate description will also inform the Authority of where such technology is available, and who owns or
supplies the technology. Any substantial technological changes or
innovations introduced after the submission of the general description must be reported to the Authority. 0 3 The Enterprise must attempt to purchase the "same or equally efficient" technology on
the open market if it wishes to obtain the technology for its own
UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex Ill, art. 5.
IId. para. 8.But see supra notes 9 and 10 and accompanying text. See also supra note
74.
'1oThe "Area" refers to the portion of the deep seabed, ocean floor, and subsoil thereof,
beyond national jurisdiction. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 1(1)(1) and Part XI.
11 UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(1): "When submitting a plan of
work, every
applicant shall make available to the Authority a general description of the equipment and
methods to be used in carrying out activities in the Area, and other relevant nonproprietary
information about the characteristics of such technology and information as to where such
technology is available." Id.
10 Id. para. 2:
"Every operator shall inform the Authority of revisions in the description
and information made available pursuant to paragraph 1 whenever a substantial technological change or innovation is introduced." Id.
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use, and the technology on the open market must be available
on
04
"fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions.'

Open market purchase under Annex III, article 5, raises two serious questions: will the technology be available on the open market,
and, if so, will it be available on fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions? Assuming that the Enterprise makes good
faith efforts to obtain the technology on the open market,"0 5 many
firms that can supply the technology may not wish to do so. Such
firms may believe that their exclusive use and ownership of the
technology is a competitive advantage in their own activities;
therefore, they would be unwilling to equip a potential competitor
such as the Enterprise. 0 6 In addition, a supplier may not feel that
the proprietary nature of its technology will be adequately protected by the Enterprise. 10 Conceivably, the Enterprise could
transfer the technology to a third party without the consent of the
owner who, in turn, has limited recourse against the Enterprise
under the treaty. 08 Presumably, the Enterprise would refrain from
such an act by its desire to have good relations with actual and
potential suppliers on the open market; however, such restraints
I" Id. para. 3(a): "[The obligation of the contractor to transfer technology to the Enterprise] may be invoked only if the Enterprise finds that it is unable to obtain the same or
equally efficient and useful technology on the open market on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions ....
" Id.
'" The Working Group of 21, formed as a more efficient body for reaching a consensus on
tough First Committee issues, was in general agreement that the Enterprise was obligated to
make such good faith efforts. See Report of the Coordinator of the Working Group of 21 to
the First Committee, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/C.1/L.28, at 3 (1980).
1I" Telephone interview with William Siapno, Executive with Deepsea Ventures, Inc.
(Nov. 1983). Mr. Siapno opined that the Enterprise was more than a simple competitor
because of its preferred political position. He compared the situation of the mining industry
under the TOT provisions as "building a bear trap and then stepping in it." Id.
7 The Convention contains no provision under which the Enterprise is obligated to protect the confidentiality of the proprietary information. Annex III, art. 14(3) protects "data"
which presumably refers to transferred data under Annex III, art. 14(1), rather than proprietary information. Individual staff members of the Authority may be subject to dismissal for
disclosing proprietary information transferred to the Authority in accordance with Annex
III, article 14. Parties recognized by the Convention can request that a proceeding take
place before a tribunal to determine whether a violation has taken place. UNCLOS, supra
note 4, art. 168(2) and (3).
I" If the Enterprise submits to the jurisdiction of a court of competent jurisdiction in a
State Party under the conditions of Annex IV, art. 13(3), the owner could bring an action
against the Enterprise, but assets of the Enterprise could not be seized in order to satisfy a
judgment which the Enterprise determines it does not wish to pay. A contractor could bring
such a dispute before the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber under Article 187(c)(ii); however, if
the illegal transfer took place under the auspices of the Authority in the exercise of its
discretion, the jurisdiction of the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber may be limited by article 189.
See infra notes 145-47 and accompanying text.
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may be illusory once the Enterprise achieves technological independence and no longer requires good will.
On the contrary, the Enterprise may have trouble choosing from
the "many eagerly proffered systems."10 9 Consortia may want to
recoup some of their investment by licensing the technology and
spreading their research and development costs. 1" 0 The Enterprise,
hypothetically armed with two to three times the money which all
existing consortia have spent to date, not only could afford entire
systems, but could contract for and build a system of its own."" A
study for the United States Department of Interior indicates that
every component of a deep seabed mining system is available from
and in spite of general
a relatively large number of suppliers,'
resistance in the industry, some suppliers have expressed their
willingness to sell technology to the Enterprise."'
The principal weakness in the open market purchase is the virtually unchecked discretion of the Enterprise to determine that the
"same or equally efficient and useful technology" is not available
on the open market at fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions. Such a determination will trigger the contractor's obligation to offer its technology to the Enterprise.
B.

Mandatory TOT to the Enterprise

An approved applicant that subsequently contracts with the Enterprise must provide its technology to the Enterprise on fair and
reasonable commercial terms and conditions if the Authority so requests." 4 The contractor is obligated to supply technology that he
"uses in carrying out activities in the Area under the contract" and
is "legally entitled to transfer," only if the Enterprise cannot ob-

"

Antrim & Sebenius, Incentives for Ocean Mining under the Convention, in
SEA 79, 91 (B. Oxman ed. 1983).
Id. at 91.
1 Id.

LAw oF

THE

' ' Science Applications, Inc., Alternatives for Technology Transfer to the Enterprise,
SAI Report No. sal-460-80-40 ILJ, at 61 (1978), cited in Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 109,
at 91.
Is According to Elliot Richardson, a number of companies have come forward to offer
seabed mining systems to the Enterprise. Testimony of Elliot L. Richardson, House Foreign
Affairs Comm., May 14, 1981, quoted in Oxman, supra note 86, at 11 n.27.
1' UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(3)(a): "[Every contract for activities in the
Area will obligate the contractor] to make available to the Enterprise on fair and reasonable
commercial terms and conditions, whenever the Authority so requests, the technology which
he uses in carrying out activities in the Area under the contract, which the contractor is
legally entitled to transfer .... "
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tain the technology on the open market. '" An instrument supple-

menting the previously granted
contract would contain the negotie

ated terms of the transfer."
Subsequent provisions which require the contractor to obtain either written assurances or enforceable contracts guaranteeing technology transfer by third party owners of technology used by the
contractor in the Area reinforce this compulsory licensing agreement. Under article 5, subparagraph 3(b), the contractor must obtain written assurance from a third party owner of technology used
by the contractor that the third party will license the technology to
the Enterprise if the Enterprise cannot purchase the technology on

the open market.1 1 7 If the contractor cannot obtain the assurance,
it cannot use the technology in question."18
Under article 5, subparagraph 3(c), the Enterprise, after failing
to obtain a technology on the open market, can request that the
contractor acquire the legal right to transfer technology which is
owned by third parties."' The contractor must acquire the legal
right to transfer technology to the Enterprise by means of an enforceable contract; however, the contractor is excused from this
duty if acquisition entails substantial cost. 2 0 If the contractor and
the third party owners of the technology in question have a "substantial corporate relationship," failure to acquire the right to

:I Id. For the text of this part of art. 5(3)(a), see supra note 113.
36 UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(3)(a): "This shall be done by means of
licen[sjes or other appropriate arrangements which the contractor shall negotiate with the
Enterprise and which shall be set forth in a specific agreement supplementary to the
contract ..
"
7 d. art. 5(3)(b):
[Every contract for activities in the area will obligate the contractor] to obtain a
written assurance from the owner of any technology used in carrying out activities
in the Area under the contract, which is not generally available on the open market and which is not covered by subparagraph (a), that the owner will, whenever
the Authority so requests, make that technology available to the Enterprise under
license or other appropriate arrangements and on fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions, to the same extent as made available to the contractor.
11e Id. "If this assurance is not obtained, the technology in question shall not be used by
the contractor in carrying out activities in the Area ...
I"d.
13 Id.
art. 5(3)(c):
[Every contract for activities in the area will obligate the contractor] to acquire
from the owner by means of an enforceable contract, upon request of the Enterprise and if it is possible to do so without substantial cost to the contractor, the
legal right to transfer to the Enterprise any technology used by the contractor, in
carrying out activities in the Area under contract, which the contractor is otherwise not legally entitled to transfer and which is not generally available on the
open market.
130 The Convention fails to indicate what constitutes "substantial cost."
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transfer the technology may lead the Authority to conclude that
the contractor did not make reasonable, good faith efforts or that
12 1
the contractor is not qualified for future mining approval.
Mandatory TOT to the Enterprise poses considerable problems
for the contractor. The TOT obligation is triggered when an unnamed organ of the Authority determines that the same or equally
efficient technology is not available on the open market at fair and
reasonable commercial terms and conditions. The contractor will
exercise no influefice in the designation of the organ which will decide to make the transfer request. 12 2 The contractor can challenge
the need for a transfer request only through the compulsory settlement procedures of Part XI. 2 The mandatory transfer itself, by
definition, does not resemble an ordinary commercial transaction.
The contractor is required to reach contractual terms and conditions with an entity that is in a vastly superior bargaining position.
The interpretation of "fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions" will determine whether the terms and conditions will
be commercially less advantageous to contractors.
Pursuant to article 5, paragraph 4, disputes as to whether the
terms of transfer offered by the contractor are "within the range of
fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions" may be submitted by either party to binding commercial arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 24 An arbitration
panel must determine whether technology developers should receive the usual monopoly price or be limited to a cost-plus
formula.125 In addition to price, a panel must consider whether a
ISI

UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(3)(c):

In cases where there is a substantial corporate relationship between the contractor
and the owner of the technology, the closeness of this relationship and the degree
of control or influence shall be relevant to the determination whether all feasible
measures have been taken to acquire such a right. In cases where the contractor
exercises effective control over the owner, failure to acquire from the owner the
legal right shall be relevant to the contractor's qualification for any subsequent
application for approval of a plan of work ....
References to the "Authority" in the provision are ambiguous and inconsistently used.
The Authority can include or exclude the Enterprise. A Council role may be inferred from
Art. 162(1) or (2)(a), but this is a weak conjecture. W. HAUSER, THE LEGAL REGIME FOR DEEP
SEABED MINING UNDER THE LAw OF THE SEA CONVENTION 99-100 (1983).
123 UNCLOS, supra note 4, Part XI, section 5. A contractor may not feel that a dispute
settlement body dominated by representatives from developing countries will reach an equitable result. See id. Annex VI, art. 35.
,2, UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(4). United Nations Commission on Interna-

tional Trade Law, Arbitration Rules, reprinted in 1 INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL ARBITRA-

181 (C. Schmitthoff ed. 1980).
"I "Monopoly price" refers to the highest price the market will bear, competition not
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variety of other contractual terms and conditions are acceptable,
including protection of confidential information, guarantees, warranties, use restrictions, grant-back clauses for technological improvements, and contractual penalties.' 2 e Many contractual terms
and conditions acceptable in ordinary commercial practice may not
qualify under the laws of individual states or the provisions of
UNCTAD's Draft Code of Conduct for TOT." 7 The arbitration
panel should refer to terms and conditions in comparable cases of
contractual practice; however, the few comparable cases can only
be found in litigation which involves the oil industry or land-based
mining. 2 81 If these cases prove to be inadequate models, contractual practice inimical to the contractor could influence the arbitration panel. Arguably, the continuing existence of fundamental differences of opinion in the larger world debate over acceptable TOT
practices would influence the panel to act more conservatively on
29
contested terms.
Under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, each party must
prove the facts on which it bases its request or decision.' 3" As a
result of the contractor's greater access to the pertinent facts in
this non-adversarial proceeding, the contractor will probably be required to carry a greater burden of proof and show why his offer is
within the acceptable range of fair and reasonable commercial

being a factor in price-setting when the developer of technology has exclusive rights to disseminating the technology. "Cost-plus formula" refers to a sales price limited to the cost of
developing the technology plus a reasonable profit. See supra note 14.
"6 W. HAUSER, supra note 122, at 101.
For examples of unacceptable contractual terms, see Draft International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, supra note 26.
:38 W. HAUSER, supra note 122, at 103.
2 Hauser believes that UNCTAD negotiations have failed for the present and will have
no effect. Id. at 105. The West German delegation to UNCLOS III, anticipating disagreement over what constitutes fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, proposed
a definition of the expression for the record:
Fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions are conditions of the kind
actually agreed in practice in comparable cases. In the absence of any comparable
case, the price agreed should be such as to make adequate contribution towards
recouping development costs. This includes the cost of development work which
has not been successful as well as the cost of work necessary to establish a basis of
knowledge for carrying out a given project. The other terms should be such that
they provide an incentive to further development effort.
Report of the Coordinator of the Working Group of 21, supra note 105, at 5. The possible
applications of this definition have yet to be tested.
130 UNCITRAL, supra note 124, art. 24, cited in W. HAUSER, supra note 122, at 106
n.328.
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terms and conditions. "' The uncertainty of a favorable outcome
for the contractor significantly increases the risks and costs of seabed mining under the regime.
The provisions on technology owned by third parties exacerbate
the problem. Most mining consortia have over one hundred suppli32
ers which own 75-80% of the technology used in mining systems.1
If the contractor cannot obtain written assurance that a supplier of
a vital piece of technology will transfer it to the Enterprise, then
the contractor may be unable to operate at all. 8 In addition, the
cost of obtaining written assurances from every supplier could be
prohibitive.
Even if a contractor were able to obtain written assurances from
all his suppliers, such assurances may be inadequate for the purposes of the Enterprise. Written assurances can range from nonbinding statements of intent to legally binding and enforceable
promises. The Convention provides no guidance concerning the degree of assurance which the contractor must obtain.'" The Authority has no jurisdiction over these third party suppliers; therefore,
the legal nature of a written assurance must be determined by the
applicable national legal order. 80 If either the Enterprise or the
contractor makes a claim in a national court, it could find that the
form of assurance which a supplier has provided is not enforceable.
The Convention does not provide for sanctions against third party
suppliers;' 81 however, actions by third party suppliers could reflect
unfavorably on a contractor, affecting future applications to work
in the Area.
Similar problems emerge from the obligation of the contractor to
acquire, by way of a legally enforceable contract, the right to transfer a technology to the Enterprise. Presumably, this obligation extends beyond the mere acquisition of equipment and applies to the
acquisition of industrial property rights and know-how. Such
rights are an economic asset, and potentially can be very costly for
the contractor. The contractor is not obligated to incur substantial

18

Id. at 106.
NYHART, supra note 31.

,

W.

"'

HAUSER, supra note 122, at 106.

14 Id. at 107.
18 Id.
1
An earlier draft text contained a "black list" provision to provide sanctions against
uncooperative third party suppliers, but this provision was deleted. See U.N. Doc. ICNT/
Rev. 1, at Annex II, art. 5(1)(b) (1979). For all practical purposes, the Authority will view
unfavorably an application by a previously uncooperative third party supplier.
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costs. 13 7 Nevertheless, problems may arise since the Convention
provides no measure for "substantial cost" nor does the Convention address the potential problems inherent in an enforceable
contract between the contractor and a third party supplier. The
latter can impose terms and conditions on the contractor that the
Enterprise might not want to accept. " 8 Conceivably, the Authority
could pressure the contractor to pay whatever amount is required
to obtain terms and conditions which are more amenable to the
Enterprise.3 9
Mandatory TOT to the Enterprise will undoubtedly burden contractors, particularly those whose primary business is mining, imposing added expenses in time, personnel, facilities, and money. "1 0
Contractors may incur further costs by providing technical assistance and training for the Enterprise. Annex III, article 15 requires
the contractor to establish training programs for the Authority and
developing state personnel."' Presently, the relationship between
mandatory TOT and this provision is unclear; however, under Annex III, article 17, paragraph 1(b)(xi), the Authority can implement rules and regulations which could set parameters for training
programs and impose the costs on the contractor. " 2
The contractor is further obligated to facilitate TOT between
third parties and the Enterprise. 4 a The contractor's efforts to fulfill this ambiguous obligation can only be judged on the "good
faith" standard of Annex III, article 4, paragraph 6(c). 4
The mandatory TOT provisions of the Convention pose another
even more costly problem for the contractor. The rationale behind
proprietary rights is to provide a competitive advantage for develUNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(3)(c); for text, see supra note 119.
133W. HAUSER, supra note 122, at 109.

187

139

Id.

"' Id. at 111. Presumably, this would burden less those consortia which form for the sole
purpose of providing mining services.
4 UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 15:
"The contractor shall draw up practical
programmes for the training of personnel of the Authority and developing States, including
the participation of such personnel in all activities in the Area which are covered by the
contract . .. ."

Id. Annex III, art. 17(1)(b)(xi).
Id. art. 5(3)(d):
[Every contract for activities in the area will obligate the contractor] to facilitate,
upon the request of the Enterprise, the acquisition by the Enterprise of any technology covered by subparagraph (b), under license or other appropriate arrangements and on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, if the Enterprise decides to negotiate directly with the owner of the technology .
144 Id. art. 4(6)(c); W. HAUSER, supra note 122, at 111.
"'
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opers of new technology; however, when the contractor provides
the Enterprise with technology, he is not only equipping a competitor but is also risking considerable erosion of his competitive advantage. This erosion would occur through the dissemination of
the contractor's technology by the Enterprise. Although the Enterprise is forbidden to pass on proprietary data received from contractors,1 4 no mechanism exists to discipline the Enterprise for
transferring technology to third parties without the consent of the
owner. In addition, the Enterprise has limited liability for damages
arising from operations. 146 Any decision made by the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber or through commercial arbitration must be enforced either by states within their jurisdiction or through the
Council's power to issue directives to the Enterprise. 14 7 The uncer-

tain outcome of this procedure and the possibility of significant
damage to the contractor's proprietary rights and commercial advantage will create considerable disincentives for cooperation with
the Enterprise. The threat to exclusivity of technology combined
with the increased costs and risks inherent in mandatory TOT will

inhibit innovation, efficiency, and investment.
C.

48

Mandatory TOT to Developing States

Annex III, article 5, paragraph 3(e), requires the contractor to
provide technology to developing countries that have applied to

exploit a reserved site.1 49 The technology must be offered on the
UNCLOS, supra note 4, Article 168(2) and Annex III, art. 14(3).
Liability lies with the Authority. See id. at Annex mI, art. 22; but see Annex IV, arts.
2(3), 13. Although the Enterprise is subject to the rules and regulations promulgated by the
Authority, id. Art. 170(2) and Annex IV, art. 1(2), there is no mechanism for punishment.
147 Id. at Annex VI, art. 39 and Arts. 162(2)(i), 170(2).
348 See W. HAusER, supra note 122, at 111 n.352; Conrad Welling of Ocean Minerals Corporation said that it would be impossible to continue the development of ocean mining technology under the TOT provisions. The Washington Times, Oct. 20, 1982, at 4A, noted in
Burke & Brokaw, supra note 97, at 53; Richard A. Letgatski, counsel to the National Ocean
Industries Association, said that foreign consortia will not be able to operate efficiently because United States companies will refuse to do business with consortia subject to the TOT
provisions. Id. But see Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 109, at 92 (The authors argue that
the negative impact is not so great considering that the proprietary parts of mining technology represent less than one-third of capital cost); compare Antrim & Sebenius with NYHART,
A COST MODEL, supra note 132, at ES 3-4 (the baseline model estimates that research and
development costs plus capital investment in technology comprises approximately one-fifth
of total pre-recovery expenditures).
For a discussion of the mining interests' alternatives to UNCLOS, see Note, Protectionof
Investment in Deep Seabed Mining: Does the United States Have a Viable Alternative to
Participationin UNCLOS?, 2 B.U. INT'L L.J. 267 (1983).
I" UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex I, art. 5(3)(e):
146
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same terms as to the Enterprise under the provisions for
mandatory TOT to the Enterprise. The contractor is released from
the obligation if the technology which the developing state requests has either been requested from or transferred to the
Enterprise. " °
This provision, also known as the "Brazil Clause," raises many
of the same problems inherent in mandatory TOT to the Enterprise. The problem of protecting exclusive technology would be
particularly acute. For example, if the developing states form a
joint venture to perform the activity, the entire joint venture
would have access to the technology. The technology could be used
later by the individual countries in mining activities in their own
Exclusive Economic Zones, 15 ' resulting in more competition for the
contractor. The contractor would have no redress for subsequent
TOT by the developing state to third parties. In addition, the developing country can make the same determinations as the Enterprise when considering whether the same or equally efficient technology is available on the open market or whether the terms of
transfer offered by the contractor are within the range of "fair and
reasonable commercial terms and conditions."
Considering the cost of seabed mining ventures, developing
countries are unlikely to invoke the Brazil Clause. 15 In this respect, the Brazil Clause is chiefly an ideological victory for the developing countries.153 Mandatory TOT in the case of the Enterprise can be distinguished as a special case because it is essential
for the operation of a parallel system, but mandatory TOT to developing states is a precedent that runs contrary to the wishes of

[Every contract for activities in the area will obligate the contractor] to take the
same measures as are prescribed in subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (d) for the
benefit of a developing State or group of developing States which has applied for a
contract under article 9 of this Annex, provided that these measures shall be limited to the exploitation of the part of the area proposed by the contractor which
has been reserved pursuant to article 8 of this Annex and provided that activities
under the contract sought by the developing State or group of developing States
would not involve transfer of technology to a third State or nationals of a third
State ....
15 Id. "The obligation under this provision shall apply with respect to any given contractor where technology has not been requested by the Enterprise or transferred by that contractor to the Enterprise." Id.
161 The recognition of Exclusive Economic Zones under the treaty, UNCLOS, supra note
4, Part V, expanded coastal state jurisdiction over some of the most productive nodule deposits. See Pardo, An Opportunity Lost, in LAW OF THE SEA 19 (B. Oxman ed. 1983).
1U

W.

'"

Id. at 113.

HAUSER,

supra note 122, at 112.
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the industrialized nations.
D.

Mandatory TOT Dispute Settlement, Enforcement, and Related Provisions
Annex III, article 5, paragraph 4, prescribes the appropriate dispute resolution process and enforcement mechanism for issues
arising under mandatory TOT both for the Enterprise and for developing states that invoke the Brazil Clause."' Binding commercial arbitration will settle disputes as to whether offers in a contract contain fair and reasonable commercial terms and
conditions. 55 The Authority may promulgate and impose arbitration rules in lieu of the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules. 56 If a finding by commercial arbitration is adverse to the contractor, he has
forty-five days to revise his offer before the Authority takes enforcement action under Annex III, article 18.1 7 Other disputes
concerning mandatory TOT are subject to compulsory settlement
before the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber pursuant to article
187(c)(ii), Part XV, and Annex VI. 5 a A finding adverse to the con-

tractor can result in suspension or termination of the contract,
or
59
monetary penalties in accordance with Annex III, article 18.1
If the Enterprise cannot obtain technology on fair and reasonable commercial terms and conditions, the Council or Assembly may
then convene a group of signatory states which either have access
to the technology or have sponsored contractors in the Area. 10
This group must take "all feasible measures" within each state's
legal system to make the technology available.1 61 Unlike the other
portions of article 5, this provision requires that the group of states
ensure the availability of processing technology in addition to recovery technology.'
The "feasible measures" provision, in essence, obligates states to coerce owners of technology into providing technology to the Enterprise.
The obligation of contractors to provide the Enterprise with
15

UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(4).

16 Id. See supra notes 124-31 and accompanying text. A commercial arbitral tribunal has
no jurisdiction to decide a question of Convention interpretation. Such questions will result
in referal to the Sea-Bed Disputes Chamber. UNCLOS, supra note 4, art. 188(2)(a).
15 UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art. 5(4).

1 Id. Annex III, art. 18.
155 Id. Art. 187(c)(ii) and Part XV and Annex VI.
15 Id. Annex III, art. 18.

'"Id.Annex III, art. 5(5).
11 Id.
152

Id.
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technology expires ten years after the Enterprise begins commercial production. 1' The Convention does not clarify whether the
ten-year period would commence at commercial production of a
joint venture with the Enterprise. The ten-year period is plainly
viewed as adequate time for the Enterprise to become technologically self-sufficient; however, the prospect of such technological
self-sufficiency raises concerns. Once the Enterprise is in control of
technology, the developing countries may attempt to achieve their
original goal of establishing exclusive mining rights for the Enterprise. By terminating the parallel system and replacing it with a
unitary system, the developing countries could accomplish this
goal. Adoption of the unitary system would require a three-fourths
majority ratification or accession at the end of the Review Conference authorized by article 155.1"
E.

Contractual TOT Under Joint Ventures with the Enterprise

The rules and procedures for mandatory TOT contained in Annex III, article 5 burden the contractor and contribute to uncertainty and risk. Concurrently, an inexperienced Enterprise will
have difficulty in determining the most appropriate technology and
in applying the technology efficiently and economically.16 5 A joint
venture between the Enterprise and another public or private
qualified party solves both of these problems. TOT in a joint venture can be negotiated independently from the Convention's
mandatory TOT provisions.1 " This flexibility allows the miner to
negotiate more favorable control over the dissemination of technology owned by himself and third parties, while the Enterprise can
enjoy the benefits of an experienced and competent operation and
its subsequent yield.
In negotiating provisions of a future joint venture regarding the
use of technology, an important point is that the practical reason
for the mandatory TOT in article 5 was to equip an Enterprise
that would operate by itself. If the ideological reasons for
mandatory TOT can be brushed aside, an Enterprise operating
only in joint venture arrangements arguably would not require

1

Id. Annex III, art. 5(7).
Comment, supra note 42, at 106-07.
G. JAENICKE, E. SCHANZE, & W. HAUSER, A JoINT VwTruR AGREEMENT FOR SEABED

MINING

33 (1981).

'" UNCLOS, supra note 4, Annex III, art 5(6).
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mining technology. 167 The "Operating Company" which the Enterprise and the qualified entity form would require access to the
technology; therefore, the Enterprise would have access as a partner in the joint venture. 16 8 In addition, personnel of the Enterprise
would acquire familiarity with the technological processes used in
seabed mining through their contact with the Operating Company.1 6, The joint venture contract could restrain the Enterprise
from using any proprietary information, patents, and know-how in
activities other than the joint venture.1 70 Transactional disputes
can be handled by a wider variety of mechanisms than those pro17
vided in the treaty.
If the Enterprise engages in joint ventures, thereby making the
mandatory TOT provisions inapplicable, it will generate a cooperative spirit with private industry and improve its subsequent ability
to acquire technology on the open market. Enterprise personnel
would also become familiar with the most efficient technology and
technique for prospective Enterprise use. Overall, the joint venture
alternative is the most advantageous for both parties.
F.

Provision Implementation Summary

The application of the UNCLOS TOT provisions in their present form raises a number of problems. Some problems are notable. For example, the inability of a contractor to challenge the determination that the same or equally efficient technology is not
available on the open market at fair and reasonable commercial
terms and conditions is a clear weakness in the provisions. There
are some provisions, however, such as the flexible joint venture alternative, that can be viewed optimistically. The negative impact
of compulsory licensing, although contrary to principles of free enterprise, is substantially diminished by basing such a sale upon fair
and reasonable commercial terms and conditions and by referring
a dispute over those terms and conditions to commercial arbitration.
117 G. JAFmcKE, E. SCHANZE, & W. HAUSER, supra note 165, at 34.
106 Id.
169 Id. at 35.
170 Id.

'71 See Christie, Techniques for Settlement of TransactionalDisputes Involving Transfer of Technology, 14 TEx. I T'L L.J. 264 (1979).
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THE FUTURE OF

TOT
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TO THE ENTERPRISE

Commentators view the TOT provisions of UNCLOS as being
generally negative; however, most seem hopeful that the provisions
will not be applied either because the Enterprise will resort to joint
venture arrangements or will easily procure technology on the open
market.

17

The Enterprise needs money to acquire technology; however,
without United States support, the Authority might not receive
the necessary financing to float a commercially viable Enterprise.
Presently, the depressed metal markets preclude commercial feasibility; however, if enough market incentive exists to adequately
finance the Enterprise, and if the Enterprise decides against joint
venture, it must purchase the technology on the open market
before invoking the mandatory TOT provisions.
Academic and industry views contrast sharply over the availability of technology to the Enterprise on the open market. Most
scholarly commentaries conclude that the Enterprise will be able
to purchase all necessary technology on the open market. 173 The
United States ocean mining industry, which apparently has concluded that it can operate outside the treaty,1 7 4 has determined
that no one else can mine without United States technology and
that United States companies will not do business with foreign
consortia subject to the TOT provisions.17 5 This industry view ignores two basic facts. First, much technology is in the hands of
non-United States interests either through independent development, equal access to technology through the consortium agreement, or transferred ownership.17 6 Second, many private United

States developers of technology are either willing to sell to the En171 See W. HAUSER, supra note 122, at 112; Burke & Brokaw, supra note 97, at 57; Antrim
& Sebenius, supra note 109, at 92; G. JAEricKa, E. SCHANZE, & W. HAUSER, supra note 165,
at 36. See Jones, The International Seabed Authority Without U.S. Participation,12
OCEAN DEV. & INT'L L. 151 (1983).
"' See Antrim & Sebenius, supra note 109, at 92; Science Applications, Inc., supra note

112, at 61; GENERAL ACCOUNTING OuICE, COMPTROLLER GENERAL's REPORT TO CONGRESS,
IMPEDIMENTS TO U.S. INVOLVEMENT IN DEEP OCEAN MINING CAN BE OVERCOE 48 (Feb. 3,

1982); Alexander, The Reaganites' Misadventure at Sea, FORTUNE, Aug. 23, 1982, at 129,
144.
174 Contra Richardson, Superpowers Need Law: A Response to the United States Rejection of the Law of the Sea Treaty, 17 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 1, 12 (1982).
'75 Remarks of Richard A. Letgatski, counsel to the National Ocean Industries Association, noted in Burke & Brokaw, supra note 96, at 53.
170 See supra note 34.
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terprise'" or have already put their technology on the open market
to recoup development costs or to raise much needed capital.""
The Enterprise, if financed, probably will be able to obtain
ocean mining technology on the open market. This conclusion
weakens any practical objection to mandatory TOT; therefore,
aside from their ideological content, the TOT provisions in UNCLOS, are an insufficient reason to reject the treaty as a whole.
CONCLUSION

The TOT provisions may be practically superfluous yet have
considerable ideological significance. Developing countries have
categorized technology under the general rubric of "the common
heritage of mankind," and accordingly, have linked the issue of
seabed exploitation to technology access. Mandatory TOT was an
ideal rallying point for the G-77 in UNCLOS III. It had practical
relevance to the negotiations at hand, and it tied those negotiations to ideological goals which unified the G-77 outside of the immediate issues. Proponents of the NIEO insist that the provisions
have established a precedent for other economic and political
negotiations.
Conversely, TOT became an ideological rallying point for the
Reagan Administration. The mandatory TOT provisions, while
probably threatening no practical adverse effects, were contrary to
basic capitalist notions; therefore, their inclusion in the treaty
helped justify the refusal of the United States to submit United
States mining interests to supranational regulation. Opponents of
the NIEO may feel that strong United States opposition to the
UNCLOS mining regime effectively blocks any precedent for other
economic and political areas.
If either side claims an ideological victory, it is a hollow victory.
The polarization of UNCLOS III participants along the lines of the
NIEO debate undermines the significance of an otherwise important contribution to international order. Future international negotiations cannot help but be tainted by the negative outcome of
UNCLOS III.
Perhaps customary international law, and its subsequent codifications, remain flexible enough to meet the changing needs of nations with respect to the oceans. After all, the exigencies of today

See Oxman, supra note 86, at 11 n.27.
178 Telephone interview with William Siapno, supra note 106.
177
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are not necessarily those of tomorrow. Much of UNCLOS is or will
become customary international law; however, the Convention itself as a codification will probably fail because of unique and perhaps overly ambitious provisions such as those on TOT, which attempt to codify a regime to manage the oceans. It may have been
folly to attempt the imposition of such a codification on vast
oceans and diverse nations, both of which continue to defy rational
control. One of the many lessons that UNCLOS should teach us is
that codifications of international law are unacceptable if static or
immutable. The attempt, nevertheless, clarifies the conflicts between nations, hopefully leading to a broader understanding and
a more flexible development of mutually beneficial common
principles.
Douglas Yarn

